Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal
Volume 7

Number 3

March 2022

Cutting the Aegean Gordian Knot: A Pathway to Harness the
Petroleum Resources Lying Within the Aegean Seabed
Costas S. Michail

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas,
and Mineral Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Costas S. Michail, Cutting the Aegean Gordian Knot: A Pathway to Harness the Petroleum Resources
Lying Within the Aegean Seabed, 7 OIL & GAS, NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 535 (2022),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal by an authorized editor of
University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact LawLibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

ONE J

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal
VOLUME 7

NUMBER 3

CUTTING THE AEGEAN GORDIAN KNOT: A
PATHWAY TO HARNESS THE PETROLEUM
RESOURCES LYING WITHIN THE AEGEAN SEABED
COSTAS S. MICHAIL
Abstract
The Aegean dispute on delimitation of maritime zones is perpetuating.
Thus, petroleum reserves remain stranded in the Aegean seabed and
subsoil. Here, the Aegean Gordian knot is unveiled, starting from laying out
a depiction of the Aegean Sea, the overlapping claims of the States, their
“deep historic bond,” and rising tensions.
The Maritime Law framework and principles, as enunciated in
International Court of Justice and arbitral tribunal, are expounded, revealing
that any “safe” prediction is hard to make on the Aegean delimitation. In
this respect, the Joint Development may offer a practical solution for
avoiding the enduring stalemate by putting aside, without jeopardising,
sovereign rights and focusing predominantly on the economic aspect.
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1. Introduction
The creation of maritime zones through the 1958 Geneva Convention
(“GV”) and United Nations Convention of Law of Sea (“UNCLOS”)
significantly diminished the purview and application of the principle of
Freedom of Sea. As a result, States saw their sovereign rights on offshore
petroleum reserves expand over the Territorial Sea up to 12 nautical miles
(“nm”), Continental Shelf, and a 200- mile Exclusive Economic Zone
(“EEZ”)1. Inevitably, the genesis of sovereign rights over the EEZ and
Continental Shelf, combined with the advent of the technological
development enabling the offshore petroleum exploration and exploitation,
prompted numerous maritime claims by different coastal States.
The geographical location of the States unveiled overlapping claims for
maritime zones, which occasionally transformed into sovereign
confrontations, demanding delimitation of the sea boundaries. The Aegean
Sea uncovers a deadlocked “delimitation battlefield” as sustained by the
“unfriendly” NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, for the last 50 years (or
more).
The Aegean Sea is said to host vast quantities of petroleum reserves
lying within its seabed and subsoil,2 which, if finally confirmed and
extracted, should release a myriad of benefits to the two States. However,
the perpetuating Aegean delimitation is at an impasse, laden with
sovereignty, territoriality, security, navigation, airspace issues, and is
haunted by the spectre of the historic division. The impasse restrains the
two States from reaping the underlying benefits by barring the International
Oil Companies (IOCs) from pouring their risk capital in the absence of
certainty and political will in the Aegean Sea. As a result, projected
petroleum reserves remain stranded. Ultimately, the two States self-harm
their interests by persisting with a stagnant course of action.
The following three sections aim to unlock an expanded portrayal of the
key ingredients composing the subject matter. First, we unveil a portrayal
of the Aegean battlefield, and the battlelines of the two opposite “camps,”
as well as their “intrinsic” historic bond, which inevitably plagues the
“delimitation.” In the next section, we delineate the International Maritime
Law in this area by unfolding key concepts codified and expounded through
the Conventional Law. These concepts seemingly embed growing flavor of
1. United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 57 (Dec.
10, 1982), https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
2. U.S Energy Information Administration, Turkey (last updated Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/TUR.
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customary international law (167 states are signatories), 3 and lay out the
principles and approach developed and employed by International Court of
Justice (ICJ) and arbitral tribunal.
Finally, we introduce and deconstruct the “joint development” concept.
The joint development concept may be recruited for unlocking the Aegean
“Gordian knot” by enabling the economic exploitation of the “hidden”
petroleum reserves while in parallel alleviating tensions, thus contributing
to the final delimitation of the maritime boundaries.
At the time of writing this paper, the Aegean dispute is gaining traction
as the two States have resumed talks following an escalating situation in the
second 6-month period of 2020.
2. Setting the ‘overlapping claim’ scenery
The Aegean Sea divides the Greek mainland from Turkish mainland. The
Aegean unveils a persisting impasse between the two states despite the
ongoing delimitation endeavours, myriad stumbling blocks pervade the
endeavour including inter alia islands, airspace, demilitarisation of Greek
islands.
The following map depicts the Aegean Sea:

Figure 14

3. Kent W. Patterson, The Crescent and the Cross: Defining the Maritime Boundaries
of Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea, 17 Loy. Mar. L.J. (2018), https://heinonline.
org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/loymarlj17&div=8&id=&page=.
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2.1 Unlocking the Aegean Geographic zones
The Aegean Sea is surrounded by the Greek and Turkish land mass
expanding north and westward and eastward, with Evros demarcating the
land boundary between the two States. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in
1923, played a dominant role for bringing an end to several territorial
disputes between the two States. 5 The Paris Treaty, signed in 19476, ceded
jurisdiction to several Greek islands (eg Rhodos) from Italy to Greece. 7
Aegean Sea is particularly narrow, with its width is ranging from 150nm
(mid- section) to 200nm8. Greek islands, rocks, low tide elevations and
islets that pervade the Aegean Sea compose a mosaic of maritime features
which complicates the Aegean delimitation.
Exacerbating the noteworthy complications, some of the Eastern Greek
islands are located remarkably near the Turkish Coastline, eg Samos’s
distance from the Turkish coast is approximate 1nm. 9
It was cited that the Greek territorial sea covers 43.68 % of the Aegean
as opposed to 7.4% under Turkey, with the remaining enjoying the status of
high seas10.
2.2 Delineation of the ‘opposite’ maritime claims posited by the
‘unfriendly allies’
The ‘suis generis’11 portrayal of the Aegean Sea sustains the perpetuating
controversy between the two ‘NATO’ allies, fortifying their battlelines
using ammunition from International Law, either conventional or
customary, while the ‘hidden petroleum reserves’ remain stranded under the
seabed.
4. Maritime disputes and international law, Constantinos Yiallourides,
https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781351240536/maritime-disputesinternational-law-constantinos-yiallourides.
5. An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes under International Law, Jon M. Van Dyke
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00908320590909088.
6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Peace_with_Italy,_1947.
7. Id.
8. Maritime disputes and international law, Constantinos Yiallourides,
https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781351240536/maritime-disputesinternational-law-constantinos-yiallourides.
9. https://www.ocearetreat.com/the-geography-and-climate-of-samos-island/.
10. Maritime disputes and international law, Constantinos Yiallourides,
https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781351240536/maritime-disputesinternational-law-constantinos-yiallourides.
11. An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes under International Law, Jon M. Van Dyke
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00908320590909088.
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Starting with Greece, the signatory of the UN Convention of Law of Sea
(“UNCLOS”) asserts its Conventional rights for application of the widely
implemented median line/equidistance giving full effect to its islands, for
Aegean delimitation. Greece currently asserts 6nm territorial sea 12 but
reserve its right to expand it to 12nm. It is noteworthy that Turkey
proclaimed a ‘casus belli’13 in the event of expansion to 12nm (reportedly
Turkey’s proclamation is especially bold for Greek islands near its
coastline). 14
In contrast, Turkey, non a signatory of UNCLOS, and ‘reportedly’
‘persistent objector’ of customary international Law, on certain maritime
aspects, postulates that the delimitation in the Aegean Sea should embrace
‘equitable principles’ because of the ‘unique’ features of the Aegean Sea,
thus ascribing weight to relevant or special circumstances under
International Law.15 In this respect, it pursues ‘degrading’ the widely
palatable median line and favors the ‘discarding’16 of Greek Islands in the
delimitation process. Equally, Turkey invokes the principle of ‘nonencroachment’17 for opposing the expansion of the territorial claim of the
Greek islands to 12nms or for the delimitation of the continental
boundary.18
The Aegean Sea needs delicate handling, thus averting destabilizing the
East Mediterranean region.
2.3 Historic divisions underpinning the delimitation zone.
In examining the perpetuating deadlock, it seems that ‘historic
ingredients’ plague the Aegean dispute. Perhaps, the starting point may be
the fall of Constantinople in 1453, moving to the rebellion and
establishment of the new Greek State in 1832 (rebellion burst out in 1821).
12. Albeit in 2020, has expanded its nm to 12 to the Ionian Sea, https://www.
aa.com.tr/en/europe/greece-oks-doubling-territorial-waters-in-ionian-sea/2117310.
13. The casus belli proclaimed in 1995, https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkishrelations/relevant-documents/territorial-sea-casus-belli.html.
14. Maritime disputes and international law, Constantinos Yiallourides, https://www.
taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781351240536/maritime-disputes-internationallaw-constantinos-yiallourides.
15. https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Policy-paper-36-Papastavridisfinal-10.07.pdf.
16. Kent W. Patterson, The Crescent and the Cross: Defining the Maritime Boundaries
of Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea, https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage
?handle=hein.journals/loymarlj17&div=8&id=&page= .
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Another starting point may be the war involving the two States at the
beginning of the 20th century, including the devastation of Smyrna in 1922
and the Greek wave of refugees from ‘Mikra Asia’ flooding Greece. 19
The foregoing historic trip unveils the long warring history between the
two opposing States embedding deep rooted division sentiments which
seem to impede the delimitation process which interacts with ‘delicate’
issues such as security, airspace, demilitarisation. Equally, the Cyprus
invasion of 1974 accentuates the division between the States.
Perhaps if the ‘hidden’ petroleum reserves decoupled from the ‘mix’, it
may alleviate tensions.
2.4 Inflaming and escalating situations
On many occasions, The Aegean Sea witnessed the two NATO allies
deploying their naval and air force ‘battalions’ commonly for Greece to
defend its asserted rights and Turkey to pursue advancing its claims.
Occasionally, the two unfriendly allies were brought to the brink of war.
In 2020, tensions escalated when Turkey issued navigational warnings
committing part of the ‘disputed’ area for exploration activities. The Oruc
Reis20 sailed into disputed areas to conduct seismic surveys under the escort
of Turkish warships, with Greece sending its warships at a close distance.
2.5 Historic attempts to delimit the boundaries and current efforts
It may be suggested that the Aegean maritime saga is a perpetuating
‘maritime delimitation battled field’ with the two States fortifying their
“battled lines”, rather than focusing on how to exercise their sovereignty in
developing and promoting the economic interests of their citizens.
The two States conducted protracted negotiations and discussions
lacking any noteworthy breakthrough. The 1970s appear to be the departure
point of this endless maritime delimitation dispute, with Turkey issuing
exploration licenses for exploring several Aegean areas,21 thus ignoring
Greece’s claims. The two States entered protracted discussions ending with
Greece instituting legal proceedings against the ICJ. However, the ICJ
declined jurisdiction by indicating that the ‘unilateral exploration steps’ as
instigated by Turkey did not justify the issue of interim measures, as they
19. Nick Kampouris, Smyrna Catastrophe: Genocide of Greeks in Asia Minor
Remembered, Greek Reporter (Sept. 13, 2021), https://greekreporter.com/2021/09/13/thecatastrophe-of-smyrna-genocide-of-greeks-in-asia-minor-remembered/.
20. FT, Tensions rise as Turkish vessel resumes exploration in eastern. Med.,
https://www.ft.com/content/76395aea-a3f2-452e-8c6a-21e5118da159.
21. Constaninos Yiallourides, Maritime disputes and international law, ch. 3.
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should not constitute irreparable actions impeding the final delimitation of
the boundaries.22
At the time of this paper, discussions have resumed. The prospects
should not be high as the States resume discussions with disagreement on
the contours and content of the dispute. Turkey pursues an all-inclusive
scope, ranging from maritime zones to demilitarization, whereas Greece
contends that the only ‘open’ matter should be the delimitation of the
continental shelf. 23
The winds of change are blowing, uncovering renewable energy, which
is increasingly gaining currency. As such, it may be high time for the
Aegean ‘gladiators’ to reconfigure their strategy by prioritizing the
economic prospects.
3. International Conventional Maritime Law and principles and approach
enunciated by International Court of Justice and arbitral Tribunal
This section is dedicated to unveiling the conventional law and concepts
of Territorial, Continental Shelf, and EEZ zones as well as islands (which
admittedly find themselves at the forefront of the Aegean maritime
delimitation saga). Reportedly, conventional law largely codifies State
practice.24 These concepts were the subject matter of Court and arbitration
cases with a flavor of ‘customary international law’ as expounded in section
3.2 below.
3.1 UN Conventional Law of Sea
3.1.1 Territorial Sea
UNCLOS envisages the right to the Coastal States to exercise and
expand their sovereignty over 12 nm over its territorial seas as well as its
seabed, subsoil, and airspace, under article 2 and 3. 25

22. International Court of Justice, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey)
(1976), https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/62. https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/62
23. Maria Gavouneli, Whose Sea? A Greek International law Perspective on the GreekTurkish Disputes, Institut Montaigne (Oct. 16, 2020),
https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/whose-sea-greek-international-law-perspectivegreek-turkish-disputes.
24. Kent W. Patterson, The Crescent and the Cross: Defining the Maritime Boundaries
of Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea, HeinOnline (2018), https://heinonline.org/HOL/
LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/loymarlj17&div=8&id=&page= .
25. UNCLOS.
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3.1.2 Continental Shelf
The point of departure in the genesis of this concept is generally
considered to be the presidential proclamation of U.S. President Truman in
1945, pronouncing that the USA’s intrinsic sovereign rights extended over
the ‘all-natural resources located within the Seabed and subsoil’ 26 of the
(USA’s) Continental Shelf.
Later ICJ’s cases27 embraced the new legal order, articulating that the
Coastal States had inherent sovereign rights over the Continental Shelf. It
was also cited that such rights apply ipso facto and ab inition.28 UNCLOS
and GC codified the principle and envisage that the continental shelf of a
coastal state consists of the seabed and submarine area, which surpasses the
territorial sea.29
UNCLOS accords exclusive sovereign rights to coastal States over their
Continental Shelf (which may extend beyond 200 miles under conditions) 30
for exploring and exploiting petroleum reserves. 31 The ‘exclusive’ rights
denote that no other State may undertake E&P operations, thus exploring
and exploiting the Continental Shelf.
3.1.3 EEZ
UNCLOS introduced the concept of EEZ which constitutes a maritime
area extending up to 200nm. It is postulated that the concept is enunciated
from State practice. 32 EEZ exists ipso jure33 (after the Coastal State
promulgates the EEZ) and confers sovereign rights to the Coastal States
(and Islands) to explore, exploit and manage petroleum reserves (the rights

26. Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, ch. 7, Cambridge University
Press (Oct. 2009), https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/sovereignty-over-naturalresources/3B26C20F3AA0D64D70103F759B7652A0.
27. International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969),
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/52/052-19690220-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf.
28. Id.
29. UNCLOS, article 76, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/
unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
30. Jon M. Van Dyke, An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes under International Law,
Jon M.Ocean Development & International Law (Feb. 24, 2007), https://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00908320590909088.
31. UNCLOS, article 77.
32. Jargen Basedow, Joint Development of Hyrdocarbon Deposits in the Law of the Sea
ch. 3, 2014.
33. Id.
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accorded expand to living and non-living natural resources of the water
column, seabed, and subsoil of the area). 34
3.1.4 Islands
UNCLOS confers equal sovereign rights to the foregoing maritime zones
to Islands under article 121. The Law of Sea explicitly denies EEZ or
continental shelf to rocks. Rocks are explicitly defined as not supporting
human life or economic life of their own. The Convention dictates no other
qualification or condition or a measurable bar for a sea feature for laying a
claim to the foreign maritime zones.
Presumably, the islands unveil a key barrier in the Aegean dispute. On
the one hand, Turkey (non-signatory to UNCLOS) favors an equitable
delimitation which effectively ignores them, whereas Greece persists in
asserting Conventional rights (with a customary law flavour)35 on its
islands.
3.1.5 Opposing or adjacent Coastal States
UNCLOS stipulates in article 83 (identical wording is used in article 74)
that the Coastal States should pursue agreement for the delimitation of their
boundaries according to international law, Article 38 of the Statute of the
ICJ, to achieve an equitable solution. 36 Failing to reach such an agreement,
the States should resort to procedures under Part XV. 37
Prima facie the narrow width in the Aegean Sea creates overlapping
claims of Greece and Turkey. As a result, the Aegean maritime delimitation
sustains an enduring deadlock.
UNCLOS introduces a provisional arrangement that may aid to escape a
stalemate in the process of reaching an equitable delimitation. In more
detail, UNCLOS envisage through articles 83(3),74(3), that Coastal States
“should make effort to enter provisional arrangement of a practical nature
and, during this”38 in the absence of a final delimitation agreement between
them.
Such provisional arrangements are typically the Joint Developments
which will be analyzed in detail below. It was stipulated that boundary

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 56, Dec. 10, 1982.
Constaninos Yiallourides, Maritime Disputes and International Law, ch. 3 (2019).
Id.
Id.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 83(3), 74(3), Dec. 10, 1982.
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delimitation is not necessary a panacea. 39 It may not be ‘panacea’ in Aegean
either for attaining the economic exploitation of the offshore ‘hidden
petroleum treasure’.
3.2 Elaborating on principles and approach developed by ICJ and
arbitral tribunal
In this section, we reveal the composite approach of the ICJ and arbitral
tribunals in demarcating maritime boundaries. The ICJ and arbitral tribunals
have been increasingly employed in this area, thus contributing to the
enunciation and formulation of principles and methodology in international
delimitation cases. Notwithstanding, the formulations and the methodology,
as developed by ICJ and arbitral tribunal, continue to embed a high level of
generality due to the intrinsic nature of the maritime delimitation, and the
different cases which reveal different geographic features and peculiarities.
The equidistance/special (which is equal to ‘relevant’) 40 circumstances
approach admittedly dominates the delimitation. It appears from a series of
delimitation cases, that the favored approach entails a three-prong test, 41
starting with drawing a provisional equidistance/median line that divides
the ‘disputed’ region and adjusting this by considering special
circumstances such as islands and navigational and security considerations.
The third component involves evaluating if the emerging outcome is
‘disproportionate’.
In the past, ICJ inclined more on an equitable approach which
commanded the balancing of the relevant circumstances,42 thus diminishing
the status of the equidistance/median line. Nevertheless, the need for
importing more certainty and predictability in the process led to the advent
of the equidistance/median line,43 which culminated into the three-prong
test.44
Moving to the islands, they constitute a key barrier for delimiting the
Aegean Sea, as the two States have different perceptions. To shed light on
39. David Ong, Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: “Mere”
State Practice or Customary International Law, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 771 (1999).
40. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar
and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgement, 1994 I.C.J. 112 (July 1).
41. The ‘predominant’ interest Concept in Maritime boundary Delimitation
42. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal
Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgement, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
43. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan
Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgement, 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14).
44. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case, Wikipedia (Jan. 26, 2022, 6:04 PM),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maritime_Delimitation_in_the_Black_Sea_case.
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this, the starting point should be the conventional law which confers
maritime rights to islands in a like manner as for coastal States and
jurisprudence of ICJ,45 which affirms the maritime rights of islands and
postulates the legal force of article 121 ((see above section 3.1.4) as
customary law.
Despite the foregoing, the ICJ and arbitral tribunal appear to alleviate the
possible distorting effect 46 of maritime features in demarcating the maritime
boundaries between opposing states. In cases involving unimportant or
uninhabited islets may be ignored47 for demarcating maritime boundaries. In
other cases, involving habituated islands, they may be granted reduced
effect if the outcome may result in a substantial diminution of maritime
zones. 48 On the other hand, full force may be accorded if they are not
isolated from the mainland and host human life and sustain economic life. 49
It may be deduced from the foregoing that ICJ’s recourse settling the
Aegean dispute will be a time-consuming process prohibiting any safe
predictions on an outcome. On one hand, Greece fortifies its standing using
the generally palatable median line and the maritime rights of islands,
whereas Turkey appears shielding behind the equitable approach and
relevant circumstances. As previously noted, the situation is exacerbated by
the intrinsic historic division and other essential matters surrounding the
dispute.
4. Can Joint Development work until formal delimitation for Greece and
Turkey
4.1 Joint Development
4.1.1 Illustration of Joint Development
The purpose of this section is to explain and analyze the joint
development concept and how it can work in the Aegean situation. Starting
with deconstructing this concept, it entails the establishment of a joint
45. Nicaragua v Colombia, 2012
46. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic (UK, France), Rep. of International Arbitral
Awards, XVIII R.I.A.A. 271 (Mar. 14, 1978).
47. Nuno Sérgio Marques Antunes, The 1999 Eritrea-Yemen Maritime Delimitation
Award and the Development of International Law, 50 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 299 (2001).
48. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic (UK, France), Rep. of International Arbitral
Awards, XVIII R.I.A.A. 271 (Mar. 14, 1978).
49. Nuno Sérgio Marques Antunes, The 1999 Eritrea-Yemen Maritime Delimitation
Award and the Development of International Law, 50 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 299 (2001).
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development area (“JDA”) governed by an interstate treaty between
opposing States having overlapping claims (the claim is presumed to be
legally correct)50 in “disputed” areas. Risking oversimplification, joint
development is commonly used as an ‘alternative to maritime boundary
delimitation’51 by giving a pragmatic and functional solution without
curtailing or renouncing the sovereign rights of the States.
Joint development typically envisages the sharing of costs and revenues.
In addition, it addresses the applicable Law to govern the JDA, the dispute
resolution mechanisms, and safeguards the sovereign rights or claims. It
also introduces a style of management. This may be the formation and
empowerment of a joint committee (joint authority management).
Alternatively, a single operator may be nominated to represent the joint
venture (Joint Venture Management). Conversely, one of the Coastal States
may undertake the task (Single State Management)).
4.1.2 Legal Basis
Joint development offers a vehicle for the opposing State to jointly
exploit the ‘hidden petroleum reserves’ in the disputed area without
infringing or hampering other States’ sovereign rights.
UNCLOS introduces the concept of ‘provisional arrangement’ (see
above section 3.1.5) pending delimitation. Although it does not explicitly 52
stipulate that joint development is a provisional arrangement, State practice,
international Jurisprudence, and scholars suggest that it is.53 It can be
discerned that the General principles of Cooperation and neighborliness are
inflicting a procedural duty (not of result) 54 for the States to negotiate in
good faith to reach a ‘provisional arrangement.’ However, it appears that
the duty does not stretch to ‘commanding’ that a Joint Development should
apply.
Noteworthy are the dictums of several Judges of ICJ who favored ‘joint
development’ and a priori ascribe an ‘elevated’ role to this. In the North

50. Maritime disputes and international law, ch. 3, Constaninos Yiallourides.
51. An Analysis of the Aegean Disputes under International Law, Ch. 6, Jon M. Van
Dyke https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00908320590909088.
52. North Sea Continental Shelf case, 1969, https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/caserelated/52/052-19690220-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf.
53. Maritime disputes and international law, ch. 3, Constaninos Yiallourides.
54. Id.
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Sea case,55 the Court inter alia propounded that a ‘Joint jurisdiction regime’
may be devised for governing overlapping areas. Additionally, in the case
of Tunisia and Libya, the minority opinion of the ICJ held that the Joint
development constituted an alternative solution.56
4.2 Can Joint Development work in the Aegean dispute
It may be suggested that the joint development concept (or broadly a
cooperative agreement) may apply in the Aegean Sea, thus aiding to escape
a stalemate and possibly expediting the economic exploitation of the
‘hidden petroleum reserves’ without the prior delimitation of the zones or
intertwined issues.
As already amply expounded above, a myriad of issues and factors
impede the Aegean ‘Gordian’ knot thus aggravating its delimitation. In this
respect, it is in the interest of both States to disentangle the offshore
petroleum exploitation from the mix.
Why shall such arrangement be easier to attain? It may be posited that
this arrangement may be easier to attain because neither State relinquishes
or loses sovereign rights or shows that it retreats. Instead, they signal that
they simply agree to jointly develop designated areas in the Aegean Sea by
adopting an international practice that is increasingly employed in similar
situations for the benefit of each States citizens. Why should they now
consider this alternative path? Fossil fuels are under siege by renewables
which are gaining currency. Soon, it may be the case that it will not be
economical or even an option for the fossil fuels to be extracted and
consumed. If so, both states will lose if they wait for formal delimitation
before commencing exploration and extraction.
The arrangement may envisage ‘division’ of the Aegean Sea into
sections. The Joint Development should start using the section that contains
the lower number of islands hence, a priori, cause the less disagreements.
The share need not be 50:50:, it may be a compromise between the two
‘opposing’ views. In any case, they should first concentrate their joint
efforts on a sector of the Aegean Sea having the least amount of islands.
Regarding the management, it is likely to be conducted through setting up a
joint authority committee with wide powers and discretion over the joint
55. Maritime disputes and international law, Constantinos Yiallourides,
https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9781351240536/maritime-disputesinternational-law-constantinos-yiallourides.
56. Kent W. Patterson, The Crescent and the Cross: Defining the Maritime Boundaries
of Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea, https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage
?handle=hein.journals/loymarlj17&div=8&id=&page= .
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development area or the appointment of a single operator for controlling the
Joint Venture. Attention should be given to dispute resolution mechanisms
aiming for the quick resolution of any dispute.
Supporting the position that this joint path may work in the Aegean Sea,
we embarked on a brief tour of practical cases where the joint development
was implemented.
Starting with the Northern and Southern China Sea region which unveils
a ‘complex scenery’ composing a mosaic of islands, common borders with
multiple overlapping claims asserted by Countries including China’s ninedash line claim. Joint development is taking place thus allowing practical
solutions in the area. For example, the 1974 JDA between Japan and Korea
concerning the southern part of the continental shelf adjacent to the two
states. The JDA was divided into segments that were explored and
exploited by concessionaires under operating agreement. 57 A joint
committee was formed for consultation.
The 1979 JDA between Malaysia and Thailand58 captures 7.2 squarekilometers in the Gulf of Thailand and employs a Joint Authority endowed
with sufficient power to manage the area while gains are equally shared. In
contrast, the 2001 East Timor-Australia JDA59 envisaged sharing of 90:10
in favor of East Timor.
The JDAs outlined above enabled the covered States to escape a gridlock
and exploit the hidden resources achieving a practical solution. The Aegean
dispute may be gradually unraveling by first divorcing the offshore
petroleum reserves through joint development. Such action should not
prejudice the asserted rights of Greece or Turkey over the Aegean Sea, and
it may not cause high political cost. It will simply precipitate the economic
exploitation of offshore petroleum resources for the benefit of both States.
In parallel, it may alleviate rising tension in the region and procure an
amicable resolution of the other matters.
5. Conclusion
In sum, we have unfolded the Aegean Sea dispute by going through the
geographic scenery, the claims and position of Turkey and Greece, and the
historic bond which occasionally fosters mistrust and impedes the

57. Yu Hui, Joint Development of Mineral Resources – An Asian Solution?, 2 Asian
Y.B. of Int’l L. 87, 93 (1992).
58. Constantinos Yiallourides, Maritime Disputes and International Law 58 (Routledge
ed., 2019). D IL
59. Id. at 200.
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delimitation process. It appears that the Aegean Gordian knot composes
various matters which exacerbate the task of delimitation.
We have also elaborated on the key maritime concepts that have a
bearing in the Aegean Sea dispute, as well as examine the principles and
approach as evolved by the ICJ and arbitral tribunal—hinting that the
Aegean delimitation cannot offer a safe prediction for the outcome.
As such, we posited that the joint development potentially offers an
alternative path that may expedite the economic exploitation of the hidden
offshore petroleum reserves without prejudicing the asserted rights of the
States. In this respect, it may be a recipe for escaping the enduring
stalemate in the Aegean Sea dispute and may alleviate tensions.
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